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Prices1. Introduction
A renewed interest in the issue of price transmission among re-
searchers and policy makers stems from two sources. First, the recent
structural changes in the food and retail sectors have led to their higher
concentration. Second, the global agricultural and energy sectors be-
came more interdependent due to the surge in biofuel production in
the last two decades, with both sectors exhibiting high price volatility.
The pass-through of the price shocks from world to domestic markets
and from agricultural commodities to food prices can have signiﬁcant
income distributional and welfare implications for farmers andthe paper. The views expressed
stances be regarded as stating
ropean Commission. This work
) under the grant number 16-
7023-21820.
cs and Rural Policy Group,
ageningen, The Netherlands.
avel.Ciaian@ec.europa.eu
. This is an open access article underconsumers; this makes the issue of price transmission very relevant
from the political economy perspective.
The pass-through of price changes along the food supply chain is
commonly found to be imperfect, meaning that a price change at the
producer (consumer) level is not fully transmitted to consumers (pro-
ducers). Literature often ﬁnds price transmission to be asymmetric,
that is, a price decrease at the producer level is slowly and not fully
transmitted to consumers while a price increase at the producer level
is transmitted more quickly and fully to consumers prices. Two main
causes of imperfect price transmissionwere identiﬁed in the theoretical
literature: the market power (e.g., McCorriston et al., 1998) and the ex-
istence of adjustment or menu costs (e.g., Ball and Mankiw, 1994).
Other causes of imperfect price transmission include, among others, ag-
ricultural policies (Gardner, 1975; Serra and Goodwin, 2003), inventory
behavior (Reagan and Weitzman, 1982; Wohlgenant, 1985), dynamics
(Azzam, 1999), the share of commodity costs in the ﬁnal product
(Bettendorf and Verboven, 2000), and accounting methods (Balke
et al., 1998).
Besides theoretical studies, there is a large empirical literature investi-
gating the price transmission in the food supply chain (e.g., Goodwin and
Harper, 2000;Mohanty et al., 1995;Miller andHayenga, 2001; Rezitis andthe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Pokrivcak and Rajcaniova, 2014). Although the studies signiﬁcantly differ
in their estimation methodology and regional and commodity coverage,
they tend to conﬁrm imperfect price transmission. Themain shortcoming
of the empirical studies, however, is their failure to provide theoretical
underpinnings and a plausible interpretation of the estimated results.
A ﬂourishing empirical literature has analyzed the effects of
biofuels on the price transmission between biofuels and feedstock
prices. An extensive literature review by Serra and Zilberman et al.
(2013) concludes that energy prices drive long-run agricultural
price levels and that instability in energy markets is transferred to
food markets. Kristoufek et al. (2014) study price transmission be-
tween biofuel markets and related commodities. They ﬁnd that both
ethanol and biodiesel prices are responsive to their production factors
(ethanol to corn and biodiesel to diesel). The strength of transmission
between both signiﬁcant pairs increased remarkably during the food
crisis of 2007–2008.
This paper contributes to the previous literature by developing a
stylized structural theoretical model for the corn sector and its vertical
linkageswith food and ethanolmarkets to analyze the impact of ethanol
and ethanol policies on price transmission in the food supply chain (and
not only between ethanol and corn prices) (Fig. 1).
This topic is of high importance given the signiﬁcant impact of
biofuels' expansion on the world agricultural commodity markets
(e.g., de Gorter and Just, 2008, 2009a; Ciaian and Kancs, 2011a,
2011b; Drabik, 2011; Serra et al., 2011; Yano et al., 2010; Zilberman
et al., 2013; de Gorter et al., 2013). In the period 2007–2010, world
ethanol production almost doubled but leveled-off after that, reaching
21.8 to 24.6 billion gallons in the period 2011–2014 (US Department
of Energy, 2015). A signiﬁcant share of corn and sugarcane produc-
tion is used to produce fuel. Several studies have shown that the
surge in biofuel production due to biofuel policies was the major
cause of the recent spikes in the global grains and oilseed prices
and that a strong and direct link between energy and commodity
prices has been created (e.g., Wright, 2011; Mallory et al., 2012; de
Gorter et al., 2015).
This paper provides an answer to a question on whether the
introduction of corn ethanol has affected the price transmission be-
tween the agricultural commodity (corn) and food markets. Because
the biofuel production is policy-driven, we also analyze how different
policy regimes affect the price transmission. More precisely, we analyze
the US corn sector and its vertical links to food and ethanolmarkets.We
consider two policy regimes: (1) a blend mandate and (2) a blender's The model structure 
Food 
demand
Corn 
processing
Corn 
supply
Ethanol 
production
Fuel market
Corn exports
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polices
Fig. 1. The model structure.tax credit. We compare these policy regimes to the no biofuel produc-
tion benchmark. The blend mandate and the blender's tax credit are
historically the most relevant policies used in the United States, and
other countries alike, to support biofuel production. We evaluate the
price transmission both from corn to food and from food to corn.
We build a tractable partial equilibriummodel where corn is used to
produce food (and feed) and ethanol by competitive ﬁrms, and is also
exported abroad.We are aware that theUS food processing industry ex-
hibits a signiﬁcant concentration; however, by assuming a competitive
market environment, we can better identify the effects of ethanol
(and the role of different policy regimes) on price transmission in the
food chain. More importantly, however, it appears that the assumption
of a competitive industry is inconsequential to the question whether
ethanol has affected the price transmission, as long as the samemarket
structure exists before and after the introduction of ethanol.
In our model, the corn market is vertically linked to a food industry
that produces ﬁnal goods for consumers. When ethanol production is
introduced, corn prices become linked to ethanol prices through a
zero-proﬁt condition following the models of de Gorter and Just
(2008), and Mallory et al. (2012).
The key ﬁnding from our simulation results based on the 2009 data
is that when ethanol production is due to a blender's tax credit, a price
shock originating in the food market transmits to the corn market at a
smaller rate compared to a situation without ethanol production
(i.e., the transmission becomes more imperfect). However, when the
ethanol production is due to a blend mandate, or the price shock
originates in the corn market (regardless of the biofuel policy), the
price transmission does not change. These differences stem from differ-
ent effects biofuel policies have on the corn price formation. Important-
ly, our results also show that the response of corn and food prices (in
absolute terms) to shocks in the corn or food markets is lower in the
presence of biofuels.
The public media and policy documents often claim that the imper-
fect price transmission is caused by market failures, such as market
power. This argument is often used to justify policy intervention in the
agricultural markets (Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004). The re-
sults of our paper show that such arguments need to be evaluated
with caution and that the market environment needs to be understood
well before a policy intervention. It is because, as we showed earlier, the
imperfect price transmission can occur even if markets are perfectly
competitive. The presence of biofuels may thus result in an imperfect
adjustment of farm gate prices to shocks occurring in the food sector.
2. The theoretical model
In order to better identify the direct impact of biofuels on the price
transmission,we abstract frommodeling the linkages of the fuelmarket
with the food sector (e.g., through higher transportation costs) andwith
the corn sector in the form of changing input costs for corn production.
Furthermore, we also abstract from other issues already investigated in
the literature, such as market power, adjustment costs, inventory
behavior, size of commodity costs in the ﬁnal product, or accounting
method. However, because biofuels production has historically heavily
depended on governmental interventions, we consider a policy dimen-
sion in our model.
In our benchmark scenario, entitled no biofuel, only the corn–food
market supply chain is considered and corn and ethanol markets are
delinked. The food market is represented by a competitive processing
sector that buys and processes corn and sells corn-based food. We
then analyze how biofuels affect the benchmark price transmission by
creating a direct link between corn and ethanol prices and quantities.
The ethanol production and the price links are primarily determined
by biofuel policies. Therefore, we consider two policy regimes: (1) a
bindingblendmandate and (2) a bindingblender's tax credit. These bio-
fuel policies have historically been used in the United States. We follow
the approach developed by de Gorter and Just (2008), Drabik (2011),
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prices (Fig. 1).
2.1. The no biofuel benchmark
In the absence of ethanol production, the total US corn supply,
SC(PC), at price PC is used for (i) domestic food (e.g., corn syrup) and
feed production (e.g., feed for hogs), collectively denoted by x, and
(ii) exports, with the export demand curve facing the USmarket denoted
by DðPCÞ. The equilibrium in the corn market thus requires that corn
supply be equal to corn food/feed demand and exports
SC PC ; Z1ð Þ ¼ xþ D PC ; Z2ð Þ; ð1Þ
where Zi, i = {1, 2}, denotes an exogenous shifter of the corn supply
curve (e.g., due to the 2011–2012 drought in the United States) and of
the foreign corn demand (e.g., hoarding of corn during periods of price
spikes), respectively. These exogenous shifters are used to derive
transmission elasticities (see below). Since there are no shocks in the
initial equilibrium, we initially set Z1 = Z2 = 0. A positive shock implies
a rightward shift in a supply or demand curve.
Domestic corn is processed by a competitive representativeﬁrm into
food/feed according to awell-behaved production function f(x) that sat-
isﬁes: f(0)=0, fxN0, and fxxb0. The subscript denotes the derivative of
the production function with respect to the argument. The produced
food is directly consumed; that is, we do not model the retail sector.
Denoting Df(p) as the total (i.e., domestic and export) demand for
food at price p and Z3 as an exogenous food demand shifter, the equilib-
rium in the food market is given by
Df p; Z3ð Þ ¼ f xð Þ: ð2Þ
The ﬁrst-order condition for proﬁt maximization in the food
processing industry implicitly deﬁnes the demand for corn
pf x ¼ PC : ð3Þ
Eqs. (1) through (3) represent market equilibrium conditions
that allows us to derive price transmission elasticities in the absence
of ethanol production pertaining to individual market shocks.
First, we consider price transmission elasticities from the corn to the
food market. We derive these elasticities by introducing exogenous
shocks in the corn supply, Z1, and the corn export demand, Z2. A shock
in the corn supply or corn export demand of dZi changes the corn
price by dPC/dZi and the food price by dp/dZi, for i = {1, 2}. Following
McCorriston et al. (2001), we calculate the price transmission elasticity,
εZi, of a shock in the corn market as
εZi ¼
dp=dZi
dPC=dZi
PC
p
for i ¼ 1;2f g: ð4Þ
The change in the price of corn is in the denominator because the
primary effect of the corn supply shock is to affect the corn price,
which in turn also has an effect on the food price.
Totally differentiating the system of Eqs. (1) through (3) and solving
for price transmission elasticities corresponding to the corn supply (Z1)
and corn export demand (Z2) shocks we obtain
εNBZi ¼
ηSf
ηSf−η
D
f
≤ 1 for i ¼ 1;2f g; ð5Þ
where η fS denotes a price elasticity of food supply (derived in Drabik
et al., 2014), and η fD is a price elasticity of food demand. Note that
because the corn supply shock and the corn export demand shockoccur in the same (corn)market, their correspondingprice transmission
elasticity turns out to be identical, given by Eq. (5).
Second, we consider the price transmission elasticity from food
to corn, εZ3
NB. We can derive this elasticity from the system of
Eqs. (1) through (3) by introducing an exogenous shock, Z3, to the food
demand
εNBZ3 ¼
ηSf
ηSf þ ϕηSC−ρηDC
≤ 1; ð6Þ
where ηCS and η
D
C denote elasticities of the corn supply and export
demand curves, respectively, and ϕ=PCSC/pf and ρ ¼ PCDC=pf denote
the shares of the value of corn supply and corn exports, respectively, in
the value of food production.
2.2. Biofuels
The price transmission elasticities derived in Eqs. (5) and (6)
represent the benchmark situation with no biofuels in place. Next, we
introduce ethanol and link them to the corn–food supply chain deﬁned
above.
We assumea Leontief production technology,where a bushel of corn
results inβ=2.8 gal of ethanol (Eidman, 2007). In addition, eachbushel
of corn processed into ethanol yields γ= 17/56 bushels of an ethanol
co-product that is returned to the corn market as an animal feed
(dried distillers grains with solubles—DDGS). The ethanol supply
curve, SE(PE), is determined by the horizontal difference between
the corn supply and demand for domestic food/feed use and exports,
adjusted by conversion coefﬁcients
SE PEð Þ ≡ λβ1−rγ SC PC ; Z1ð Þ−x−D PC ; Z2ð Þ
 
; ð7Þ
where PE denotes the ethanol price; r denotes the relative price of DDGS
and corn; and the coefﬁcient λ= 0.7 denotes miles traveled per gallon
of ethanol relative to gasoline (de Gorter and Just, 2008), and is used to
consistently convert all quantities and prices into gasoline energy-
equivalent terms (Cui et al., 2011; Lapan and Moschini, 2012).
In the presence of ethanol production, the term x does not represent
solely yellow corn (as it is the case when ethanol is not produced) but
rather the corn-equivalent quantity of corn and DDGS used in food pro-
duction. The dollar value in which we measure the food production
makes it possible to accommodate a possibly separate use of DDGS
(e.g., as a hog feed, where the pork is subsequently counted as food)
and yellow corn (e.g., directly used for pop-corn) in food production.
To simplify the analysis, we assume a constant processing cost, c0,
per gallon of ethanol produced. The zero marginal proﬁt condition for
ethanol production then implies a link between corn and ethanol prices
(de Gorter and Just, 2008; Drabik, 2011; Lapan and Moschini, 2012)
PC ¼ λβ1−rγ PE−c0ð Þ: ð8Þ
The equilibrium in the fuelmarket is obtained by setting the gasoline
supply, SG(PG), and the ethanol supply [Eq. (7)] equal to the fuel
demand, DF(PF)
DF P Fð Þ ¼ SG PGð Þ þ SE PEð Þ; ð9Þ
where PG and PF denote the gasoline and the fuel price, respectively.
The corn and ethanol price formation depends on the policy regime.
Therefore, we next consider a blendmandate and a blender's tax credit.
2.2.1. A binding blend mandate
Although the US Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) stipulates a quanti-
tative mandate for ethanol, in practice, it is implemented as a blend
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under a quantity mandate. Under a binding blend mandate, α, ethanol
has to constitute at least α[×100] percent of the ﬁnal fuel blend.
Therefore, when the mandate is binding, ethanol and gasoline are
complements. The fuel price, PF, is equal to the weighted average of
the ethanol and gasoline prices, adjusted for the fuel tax, t, and the eth-
anol tax credit, tc (if any) (de Gorter and Just, 2009b; Drabik, 2011)
P F ¼ α PE þ t=λ−tc=λð Þ þ 1−αð Þ PG þ tð Þ: ð10Þ
The blend mandate requires that ethanol supply be proportional to
the fuel demand
SE PEð Þ ¼ αDF P Fð Þ: ð11Þ
Because the fuel demand is price-inelastic (Havránek et al., 2012),
the right-hand side of Eq. (11) essentially determines the amount of
ethanol to be produced for a given mandate. In combination with
Eq. (7), the amount of ethanol in (11) also determines the amount of
corn to be processed. As a result, with a binding ethanol mandate,
the corn and ethanol prices are determined solely on the corn market
(except for the small impact of the corn market on the gasoline market
under an endogenous gasoline price. But this does not make much
difference conceptually. The corn market feedback on gasoline through
ethanol is minimal because the ethanol share in the US total fuel is
rather small, around 7% in 2009 and 10% currently). The intuition is
that when ethanol blending is mandatory, ethanol processors are
“forced” to acquire corn from the corn market at any price. This implies
that a shock occurring on the cornmarketwill be absorbed by the resid-
ual corn used for food/feed.
The market equilibrium conditions when the ethanol price is deter-
mined by a blend mandate [given by (2), (3), (7), (8), (9), (10), and
(11)] can be used to derive for price transmission elasticities corre-
sponding to the corn supply (Z1), corn export demand (Z2), and food
demand (Z3) shocks
ε BMZ1 ¼ ε BMZ2 ¼
ηSf
ηSf−η
D
f
≤ 1 ð12Þ
εBMZ3 ¼
ηSf
ηSf þ ϕηSC−ρηDC
 
−
αμ
ωm
ηSGη
D
F
P F
PG
≤ 1 ð13Þ
where ω=PFSE/PCSCE, and m ¼ ηSG P FPG −ð1−αÞηDF ;ηG
S and ηFD denote
gasoline supply and fuel demand elasticities, respectively.
The magnitudes of elasticities in (12) in general differ with no corn–
ethanol linkage Eq. (5). The reason is that both sets of elasticities pertain
to different market equilibria.1
Formula (13) differs from formula (6) by a term that captures the
parameters of the fuelmarket. Since the term is positive, the transmission
elasticity for a food demand shock under a blend mandate should gener-
ally be smaller than the transmission elasticity with no biofuels. Note,
however, that because the market equilibria corresponding to formulas
(6) and (13) are not the same, the magnitudes of the (endogenous)
terms ϕ and ρ differ between the formulas, making the two elasticities
not exactly comparable.
2.2.2. A binding blender's tax credit
Under a bindingblender's tax credit, fuel consumers are notmandat-
ed to consume ethanol; therefore, they will only do so if the consumer
price of ethanol, inclusive of the reduced tax due to the tax credit, tc, is1 This point is explained in a greater detail in the section on data and calibration.the same or lower than the consumer price of gasoline, that is, PG + t
(de Gorter and Just, 2008; Cui et al., 2011; Lapan and Moschini, 2012).
This results in the equilibrium equation of the market price of ethanol
given by
PE ¼ PG− 1=λ−1ð Þt þ tc=λ; ð14Þ
whereas the consumer fuel price is given by
P F ¼ PG þ t: ð15Þ
Then, Eqs. (8) and (14) imply the following price formation for corn
PC ¼ λβ1−rγ PG− 1=λ−1ð Þt þ tc=λ−c0½ : ð16Þ
Eq. (16) implies a direct link between corn and gasoline prices. The
corn price is fully linked to the gasoline price, meaning that a change
in the gasoline price is fully transmitted to the corn price. Naturally,
given the relative sizes of the corn and gasoline markets, a shock in
the corn price will have a minimal (if any) effect on the gasoline price.
The equilibrium conditions (2), (3), (7), (8), (9), (14), and (15) can
be used to solve for price transmission elasticities corresponding to the
corn supply (Z1), corn export demand (Z2), and food demand (Z3)
shocks
εTCZ1 ¼ εTCZ2 ¼
ηSf
ηSf−η
D
f
≤ 1 ð17Þ
εTCZ3 ¼
ηSf
ηSf þ ϕηSC−ρηDC
 
þ μ
ω
θηSG−ση
D
F
  ≤ 1; ð18Þ
where θ=PFSG/PGSE and σ=PGDF/PGSE.
The last term in the denominator in Eq. (18), μ(θηGS−σηFD)/ω, is un-
ambiguously positive, which implies that the price transmission elastic-
ity with the binding tax credit should generally be smaller than the
elasticity with no biofuel. For the extreme case of a perfectly elastic
gasoline supply and/or fuel demand curve, expression (18) reduces to
εZ3
TC=0. In this case, the corn price does not respond to food demand
shocks; the corn price is directly linked to the exogenous gasoline
price-through the ethanol price given in (14) and is thus insensitive to
any shock in the food market. This implies that the linkage between
corn and ethanol markets makes the corn price less responsive to food
price changes when the tax credit is binding.
Note that assuming a zero tax credit [i.e., tc = 0 in Eq. (14)] and a
sufﬁciently high gasoline price, the model collapses to a situation of no
biofuel policies, that is, ethanol production in the absence of a policy in-
tervention. Because the market equilibrium does not change qualita-
tively in this special case, the price transmission elasticities are the
same as under the tax credit. For this reason, we do not analyze the no
biofuel policy scenario further.
2.2.3. Corn price formation: a graphical illustration
Because the corn price formation is key to understanding the intui-
tion behind the price transmission elasticities simulated in a later sec-
tion, Figs. 2 and 3 graphically (and in a simpliﬁed manner) illustrate
how the corn price is determined under a blender's tax credit and a bio-
fuel mandate. Because biofuels interact with the food supply chain
through corn, this new linkage can potentially alter the price transmis-
sion between food and corn as compared to the no biofuels benchmark.
To simplify the graphical exposition, we assume a ﬁxed gasoline price
and all corn is supplied to the domestic market (these assumptions
are relaxed later in the paper). The horizontal axis shows the quantity
of corn, Q, and the vertical axis measures the corn price, PC. With no
ethanol and no shock, the derived food demand for corn is given by
the downward sloping curve Dfo and the corn supply is represented by
Corn market with a tax credit 
PC
Sc1
Sco
Dfo
PCBo
QBF QB1 QBo Corn quantity
0
PC1
Q1 Qo
PCo
Fig. 2. Corn market with a tax credit.
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no biofuels and no shock is (Qo, PCo) in both ﬁgures, meaning that all
corn, Qo, is processed for food at price PCo.
Now assume a tax credit is introduced that makes ethanol produc-
tion proﬁtable. As a result, the new corn market price is PCBo in Fig. 2,
and it is linked to the ethanol price as given by Eq. (8). The equilibrium
with the tax credit shifts from (Qo, PCo) to (QBo, PCBo ). The new quantity of
corn supplied to the food production is QBF and the residual, QBo − QBF,
goes to the ethanol production.
Next, assume an exogenous corn supply shock that shifts the corn
supply curve from SCo to SC1. With no biofuels, the equilibrium would
shift from (Qo, PCo) to (Q1, PC1). However, because with the tax credit the
corn price is directly linked to the gasoline price [given by Eq. (16)],
any shock occurring on the corn market is absorbed by the fuel market
via a reduction in the corn destined for ethanol (QBo − QB1), with no im-
pact on the corn price (it stays at PCBo ). Note that the corn-food use is un-
altered at QBF. Overall, comparing the change in market equilibria due to
a shock with and without biofuels, we observe that biofuels reduce the
corn price change under the tax credit, implying that we can expect
lower (i.e., more imperfect) price transmission elasticities between
food and corn markets relative to the (no biofuels) benchmark.
Another biofuel policy we consider is an ethanol mandate. Although
in the paperwemodel a blendmandate (which speciﬁes a ﬁxed share of
ethanol in the fuel blend and the quantity of ethanol may vary, depend-
ing on the total fuel consumption), for ease of exposition andwith no ef-
fect on the qualitative results, we consider a quantity mandate (whichCorn market with a mandate 
QBo Corn quantity0 QB1
PC
Sc1
Sco
M
PCB1
PCBo
Dfo Df1
PC o
PC 1
Q1 Qo
Fig. 3. Corn market with a mandate.speciﬁes a ﬁxed quantity of ethanol and the share of ethanol may
vary) in Fig. 3.2 We denote the quantity of corn dedicated to ethanol
production under themandate byM. Because the ethanol mandate cre-
ates additional demand for corn, the original corn demand curve Dfo
shifts horizontally out to the right by distanceM to achieveDf1. Themar-
ket equilibrium shifts from (Qo, PCo) to (QBo, PCBo ). In equilibrium, the re-
sidual quantity of corn, QBo −M, is used in food production. In contrast
to the tax credit (where the corn price is determined by the fuel
market), with the mandate the corn price is determined on the corn
market by the intersection of the total corn demand curve, Df1, and the
corn supply curve, SCo.
Like above, we assume a corn supply shock that shifts the corn sup-
ply curve from SCo to SC1 (Fig. 3). The corn price and quantity both adjust
to the shock with and without biofuels. With biofuels, the equilibrium
shifts from (QBo, PCBo ) to (QB1, PCB1 ), whereas without biofuels the equilib-
rium relocates from (Qo, PCo) to (Q1, PC1). In either case, all adjustments to
the shock take place on the corn-food market. Similar results hold for
the food demand shock. Overall, these results indicate that with a
mandate in place, biofuels do not affect the corn price formation, imply-
ing that under a biofuel mandate we expect no change in the price
transmission cause due to biofuel production.3. Data and calibration
We calibrate themodel to the data describing the US corn, food, and
fuel markets in 2009. The demand and supply curves exhibit constant
price elasticity. We adopt some parameters and raw data from a well-
established paper by Cui et al. (2011) as their corn–ethanol model is
also calibrated to the year 2009. Where our data differ from theirs, we
explain why that is the case. A self-explanatory documentation of the
data used is presented in Table 2. All fuel price and quantity data are
converted into gasoline energy-equivalents to consistently model the
linkages in the fuel market.
Two principal corn ethanol policies were in place in the United
States in 2009: the blender's tax credit and the blending (share) man-
date. Because only one biofuel policy can determine the biofuel price
at a time (de Gorter and Just, 2009b), it is crucial to determine the
binding policy in order to properly calibrate the model. Cui et al.
(2011) calibrate their model to the blender's tax credit arguing (in
footnote 36) that “because ethanol production for 2009 exceeds the
mandate level, […] the mandate does not bind, and […] it is the fuel
tax and ethanol subsidy policies that affect equilibrium values.”Howev-
er, de Gorter and Just (2010) show that the comparison of the observed
quantity of ethanolwith themandated level does not reliably determine
which policy is binding and argue for comparing the observed ethanol
market price with what the price would have been if the tax credit
had been binding. de Gorter and Just (2010)’s empirical analysis
shows that the binding policy in 2009 was the mandate. An indication
that the blender's tax credit was not a binding policy in 2009 is the
gasoline price. Cui et al. (2011) calculate it to be $2.11/gal, which is 35
cents more than the observed wholesale price of $1.76/gal. Thus, we
calibrate our model to a binding mandate combined with a tax credit.
The upper part of Table 2 presents parameters that describe the link
between corn and ethanol prices and quantities; we also recognize that
one gallon of corn ethanol yields only approximately 70% of themileage
compared to gasoline. The returns-to-scale parameter of the food
production function is estimated to be ε= 0.33, which corresponds to
the food supply elasticity of η fS = 0.48 (Drabik et al., 2014).2 Given that for illustration purposewe assume an exogenous gasoline price in Fig. 3 (no
impact of ethanol on gasolinemarket), the quantity mandate and the blendmandate have
equivalent implications for the corn market (the ethanol quantity is equal in both cases).
In simulations, we relax the assumption of an exogenous gasoline price. However, because
of the small size of the ethanol production relative to the size of gasolinemarket, the intu-
ition of the effects illustrated in Fig. 3 also holds for the endogenous gasoline price and
blend mandate as considered in the simulations.
Table 1
Products included in the value of food production using corn.
Products and
service codes
Meaning of products and service
codes
Sum of products
shipment value ($1000)
3112117 Corn mill products 1,830,037
3112211 Corn sweeteners 6,070,174
3112214 Manufactured starch 2,189,667
3112218 Corn oil 992,574
311611A Pork, not canned or made into sausage,
slaughtering plants
16,379,772
311611G Pork, processed, not made into sausage,
slaughtering plants
2,137,591
3116121 Pork, processed/cured, purchased carcasses 8,296,984
311615 Poultry processing 51,150,442
3119194 Corn chips and related products 5,807,472
Total 94,854,713
Source: The Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM), US Census Bureau.
5 We have also simulated the model with 1-, 5-, 25-, 50-, and 75% shocks. Because the
price transmission elasticities are largely unaffected we do not report these results. Only
for the 50- and 75% shocks, the elasticities differ slightly relative to the 10% shock. This
is expected given that themagnitude of shocks is relatively large and thus effects may de-
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α=0.057 as the share of the (energy) amount of ethanol in the (energy)
amount of total fuel. In 2009, a corn ethanol blender's tax credit of
$0.45/gal and the (federal and state average) gasoline tax of $0.39/gal
were also in place.
The gasoline and ethanol wholesale (rack) prices come fromOmaha,
Nebraska. The price of fuel is equal to the weighted average of ethanol
and gasoline prices adjusted for the fuel tax and the tax credit, and
amounts to $2.17 per gasoline energy-equivalent gallon (GEEG). Corn
and ethanol prices are linked through a zero marginal proﬁt condition
for ethanol production. The price of food is normalized to unity, which
makes it possible to use the dollar value of the food production as the
food quantity.
The US ethanol production (equal to consumption in our model) in
2009 amounted to 10.76 billion gallons (corresponding to 7.53 billion
GEEGs), and the total fuel (i.e., gasoline and ethanol) consumption
was 134.74 billion gallons. Therefore, the gasoline consumption equals
134.74–10.76 = 123.61 billion gallons, making the total fuel consump-
tion in energy terms be equal to 131.14 GEEGs.
Corresponding to the 10.76 billion gallons of ethanol is 2.84 billion
bushels of yellow corn; this estimate does, however, not take into ac-
count the amount of the ethanol co-product, DDGS (dried distillers
grains with solubles) that is returned to the corn market. Taking the
DDGS into consideration, the total quantity of yellow corn diverted to
ethanol production is 3.84 billion bushels. The difference between
3.84 billion bushels and 2.84 billion bushels thus gives the amount of
DDGS placed on the market. Following Hoffman and Baker (2011), we
assume 81% of DDGS is consumed domestically and the rest is exported.
The total yellow corn supply in the United States in 2009 was
13.15 billion bushels, of which 1.86 billion bushels were exported. We
estimate the quantity of yellow corn used in food/feed as the residual
after the export and ethanol markets have been satisﬁed, that is,
13.15− 3.84− 1.86 = 7.45 billion bushels. However, the total amount
of corn equivalent used in the food/feed sector is equal to 7.45 +
0.81 × 1.00 = 8.26 billion bushels, reﬂecting that 81% of DDGS stayed
in the domestic market in 2009. We made a similar adjustment for the
corn-equivalent amount of exports.
We use the Annual Survey of Manufacturers (ASM) from the US
Census Bureau to estimate the value of food production that is related
to corn.3 The total value of food production where corn is used is
$94.85 billion. The items included in this amount are presented in
Table 1. Because more than 80% of US corn ethanol plants are dry
mills due to lower capital costs,4 we donot include products ofwetmill-
ing into the value of food production.
Demand and supply elasticities play an important role in our analy-
sis. We use the central estimates for elasticities of corn supply, foreign
corn import demand, and gasoline supply as reported in Cui et al.
(2011); the lower and upper limits for the sensitivity analysis are also
very similar (see the bottom part of Table 2) to Cui et al. (2011)’s. The
elasticity of food/feed corn demand is calculated as per Eq. (A4.6) and
is equal to −0.23, which is very close to −0.20, a value reported by
Cui et al. (2011).
The elasticity of food demand comes from Seale et al. (2003) and is
equal to −0.09, which is consistent with the empirical observation
that demand for food is very inelastic. Central estimate of the fuel de-
mand elasticity of−0.26 comes from Hamilton (2009), and the lower
and upper limits reﬂect the low and upper estimates of the meta-
analysis by Havránek et al. (2012).
4. Simulation results
We calibrate the model to a binding mandate combined with a tax
credit using the data for 2009 and parameters reported in Table 2.3 http://www.census.gov/manufacturing/asm/historical_data/index.html
4 http://www.afdc.energy.gov/fuels/ethanol_production.htmlThen we use the calibrated model to simulate the benchmark of no
biofuels as well as the equilibrium with binding mandate (without tax
credit) and a binding blender's tax credit. These three policy regimes
(i.e., no biofuels, a binding mandate, and a binding blender's tax credit)
are considered for simulations to derive the price transmission elastici-
ties. We have also run the model to derive the price transmission elas-
ticities where we assume binding mandate with tax credit in place.
Because the results are identical to the case of the mandate only, we
do not report them further. This is because mandate determines the
equilibrium in the corn and biofuel markets. The tax credit affects only
the ethanol price level with no impact on the interlinkages between
markets.
To derive price transmission elasticities, we separately introduce
exogenous shocks in corn supply, corn export demand, and corn food
demand, denoted as Z1, Z2, and Z3, respectively. The ﬁrst two shocks
allow us to identify the price transmission elasticity from the corn to
the food market because they introduce exogenous changes in the
corn market. The corn food demand shock induces changes in the ﬁnal
consumer demand, which allows as to identify the price transmission
elasticity from food to corn. The magnitude of each shock is equal to
10%5 of the consumption/production corresponding to the no-shock
equilibrium. Thus, for example, the (negative) corn supply shock
under the binding tax credit regime is equal to 10% of the corn supply
in the shock-free equilibrium. The price transmission elasticities are
calculated from the simulated changes in corn and food prices relative
to the no-shock prices.
We perform a Monte Carlo analysis to check the robustness of our
results to the exogenous elasticities. To that end, we vary elasticities of
corn supply, foreign corn import demand, food demand, fuel demand,
and gasoline supply. We make 5000 random draws for each of the
elasticities from a beta distribution whose parameters are derived
from the lower, central, and upper values of the elasticities speciﬁed
in Table 2, using the PERT method (Davis, 2008).
4.1. Price transmission elasticities
Table 3 presents a summary of results for the price transmission
elasticities obtained from Monte Carlo simulations. We focus on the
central estimates of transmission elasticities (the bold font). The price
transmission elasticity from corn to food in the no biofuels benchmark
is 0.84 (for corn market shocks Z1 and Z2), meaning that a 10% increase
in the corn price causes an 8.4% increase in the price of food. On thepart, to a certain extent, from the comparative static results derived in Section 2. However,
the overall results of the paper are not affected by the size of the shocks; the results are ro-
bust across all simulated shocks.
Table 2
Data sources (2009).
Variable/parameter Symbol Value Unit Source
Parameters
Miles per gallon of ethanol relative to gasoline λ 0.70 de Gorter and Just (2009a)
Ethanol produced from one bushel of corn β 2.80 Gallon/bushel Eidman (2007)
DDGS production coefﬁcient γ 17/56 Eidman (2007)
DDGS relative price to corn r 0.86 r= (PDDGS*56)/(PC*2000)
Price and quantity link between corn and ethanol market k 2.65 GEEG/bushel k= λβ/(1− rγ)
Ethanol processing cost c0 1.14 $/GEEG c0 = PE− PC/k
Returns to scale parameter of the food production function ε 0.33 ε=PCx/pf
Share of domestic consumption of DDGS ω 0.81 Hoffman and Baker (2011)
Value of corn supply in value of food production ϕ 0.52 ϕ=PCSC/pf
Value of corn equivalent exports in value of food prod. ρ 0.08 ρ ¼ PCDC=pf
Value of (initial) corn used in ethanol in value of food production μ 0.11 μ=PCSCE/pf
Policy variables
Blend mandate a α 0.06 α= E/F
Ethanol tax credit tc 0.45 $/gallon RFS2 b
Fuel tax t 0.39 $/gallon Cui et al. (2011)
Prices
Gasoline price PG 1.76 $/gallon Gasoline average rack price in Omaha, Nebraskac
Ethanol market price (volumetric) Pe 1.79 $/gallon Ethanol average rack price in Omaha, Nebraskac
Ethanol market price (energy) PE 2.56 $/GEEG PE = Pe/λ
Fuel price PF 2.17 $/GEEG Eq. (10)
Food price p 1.00 Normalized
Corn market price PC 3.74 $/bushel Cui et al. (2011)
DDGS price PDDGS 114.38 $/ton d Cui et al. (2011)
Quantities
Fuel demand (volume) ~F 134.37 Billion gallons Cui et al. (2011)
Fuel demand (energy) F 131.14 Billion GEEGs F= G + E
Ethanol consumption (volume) e 10.76 Billion gallons Cui et al. (2011)
Ethanol consumption (energy) E 7.53 Billion GEEGs E= λe
Gasoline supply G 123.61 Billion gallons G= ~F − e
Corn supply SC 13.15 Billion bushels Cui et al. (2011)
Consumption of yellow corn for food/feed ~x 7.45 Billion bushels ~x ¼ Sc−~SEC−~D
Consumption of corn-equivalent for food/feed x 8.26 Billion bushels x= ~x+ DDGSH
Foreign yellow corn import demand ~D 1.86 Billion bushels Cui et al. (2011)
Foreign corn equivalent import demand D 2.05 Billion bushels D= ~D+ DDGSF
Corn used in ethanol production (initial) e SCE 2.84 Billion bushels SCE=E/k
Corn used in ethanol production (equilibrium)f ~S
E
C
3.84 Billion bushels ~S
E
C ¼ SEC=ð1−rγÞ
DDGS supply DDGS 1.00 Billion bushels DDGS = rγ~S
E
C
Domestic DDGS consumption DDGSH 0.81 Billion bushels DDGSH = ω*DDGS
DDGS exports DDGSF 0.19 Billion bushels DDGSF = (1− ω)*DDGS
Food production f 94.85 Billion dollars The Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM), US Census Bureau g
Elasticities Central (low, high)
Elasticity of corn supply ηCS 0.30 (0.00, 0.50) Cui et al. (2011)
Elasticity of food/feed corn demand ηCD −0.23 (−0.29, 0.00) Eq. (A4.8)
Elasticity of foreign corn import demand ηDC −1.50 (−3.00,−1.00) Cui et al. (2011)
Elasticity of food demand ηfD −0.09 (−0.12, 0.00) Seale et al. (2003)
Elasticity of fuel demand ηFD −0.26 (−0.31,−0.09) Hamilton (2009)
Elasticity of gasoline supply ηGS 0.20 (0.10, 0.50) Cui et al. (2011)
Notes:
a The blend mandate is expressed in energy terms.
b Renewable fuel standard.
c http://www.neo.ne.gov/statshtml/66.html.
d Short ton (= 2000 lb).
e This quantity of corn does take into account the market effects of DDGS.
f This quantity of corn takes into account the market effects of DDGS.
g http://www.census.gov/manufacturing/asm/historical_data/index.html.
195D. Drabik et al. / Energy Economics 55 (2016) 189–199other hand, for the reverse direction (i.e., from food to corn) the price
transmission elasticity (for food demand shock Z3) is smaller, at 0.61:
a 10% increase in the price of food has corn prices increase only by
6.1%. The price transmission from the corn market to the food market
is greater than the otherway around becausewe consider larger elastic-
ities of corn supply and export demand relative to the elasticity of food
demand which causes smaller corn price responses than food price re-
sponses to a given shock [see Table 2 and Eqs. (5) and (6)].
For the binding mandate, the price transmission elasticities in both
directions are very similar to the benchmark elasticities. Note that a
binding mandate generates the same results as when a mandate iscombined with tax credit. As illustrated in Fig. 3, this result is expected.
With the mandate in place, biofuels do not, in principle, affect the corn
price formation. Note that at the current mandate levels the ethanol
market—the only link in our model between corn and food markets on
the one hand and the gasoline market on the other—is small relative
to the gasoline market. As a result, the simulated market shocks have
a minimal impact on the fuel price which, in connection with inelastic
fuel demand, implies minimal changes in the fuel consumption. There-
fore, given the blendmandate—implemented as a ﬁxed share of ethanol
in the fuel consumption—the amounts of ethanol and corn dedicated to
ethanol production are not very sensitive to the market shocks. With
Table 3
Price transmission elasticities⁎.
No biofuel
(benchmark)
Mandate Tax
credit
Price transmission elasticity from corn to food
Corn supply shock (Z1) Central 0.84 0.83 0.84
Min 0.79 0.79 0.80
Max 0.98 0.98 0.98
Corn export shock (Z2) Central 0.84 0.84 0.84
Min 0.80 0.80 0.80
Max 0.98 0.98 0.98
Price transmission elasticity from food to corn
Food demand shock (Z3) Central 0.61 0.63 0.35
Min 0.49 0.53 0.27
Max 0.74 0.80 0.45
Source: Own calculations.
⁎ Summary statistics for 5000 simulations; the standard deviation in each case is between
0.03 and 0.04.
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196 D. Drabik et al. / Energy Economics 55 (2016) 189–199themandate, the effects of themarket shocks are absorbed in the resid-
ual corn-food market. For example, the more the corn supply contracts
(e.g., due to bad weather), the less corn is available for domestic food/
feed use and for exports (the allocation between the two corn uses
depends on relative demand elasticities of the food/feed and export
demand curves), which increases corn prices but the amount of corn
for ethanol does not change much.
Since for a given mandate the amount of ethanol does not respond
signiﬁcantly to the market shocks, the corn price is effectively deter-
mined in the corn market. In order to produce the mandated quantity
of ethanol, ethanol producers need to pay for corn at least as much as
the food sector is willing to pay. This mechanism of price formation
under the mandate means that biofuels do not signiﬁcantly affect the
price transmission of shocks between corn and food prices. A change
in the food (corn) price will be transmitted to the corn (food) price at
the same rate both with the mandate and with no biofuels. This is
documented by almost identical transmission elasticities in the ﬁrst
two columns in Table 3.
As expected, we observe partially different results when the tax
credit is binding, leading to imperfect price transmission in the food
supply chain.6 A signiﬁcant effect of biofuels along the food supply
chain occurs for the price transmission from food to corn (i.e., for the
food demand shock). In this case, the transmission elasticity decreases
signiﬁcantly, from 0.61 to 0.35, as compared to the no biofuel bench-
mark (Table 3). The reverse elasticity from corn to food (associated
with the remaining shocks) is largely the same as in the benchmark
case.
With the binding tax credit, consumers are not mandated to con-
sume ethanol. They will only do so if the consumer price of ethanol is
lower than the consumer price of gasoline. This implies that under a
binding tax credit the corn price is determined by the gasoline price
(through the ethanol price) and not on the corn market as it was the
case under the binding mandate (Fig. 2). Consequently, a shock in the
food market will affect the corn price only to the extent to which it
can affect the gasoline price. Given the small size of the ethanol market
relative to the gasolinemarket, the price transmission from the food-to-
corn market is also small.
The price transmission from corn to food (induced by the shocks
originating in the corn market) is not affected by biofuels because,
biofuels do not affect the price linkages in the processing or food
markets, thus any change in the corn price is transmitted to the food
price at the same magnitude with or without biofuels.
The reader might have noticed that the transmission elasticities in
our model are relatively high and do not reﬂect the fact that corn6 Same results hold for zero tax credit and ethanol production in equilibrium (i.e., no
biofuel policies). Because the results and the intuition do not differ qualitatively we do
not report these results.accounts for less than 8% of the retail value of food. For example, we
have shown that a 10% shock in the corn price results in an 8.4% increase
in the food price (assuming corn is the only variable input into food pro-
duction) in the absence of biofuels. The high price transmission elastic-
ities in our model are primarily due to assuming that consumers
consume the food directly; that is, we do not model the retail sector.
Taking into account the 8% share of corn in the retail price of food, a
10% shock in the corn price is then in reality expected to cause only a
0.67% (= 0.84 × 10 × 0.08) increase in the food price. We argue, how-
ever, that this adjustment does not affect our qualitative results as the
effects of the retail sector are independent of the binding biofuel policy.
The sensitivity analysis indicates that our results are robust to
different assumptions about the model parameters. Fig. 4 reports box
plot results for the transmission elasticities obtained from the 5000
simulations where we varied exogenous model parameters. Similar to
results reported in Table 3, the ﬁgure clearly indicates that the price
transmission elasticities from corn to food exhibit similar magnitudes
and variation across different shocks and policy regimes. On the other
hand, the price transmission elasticity from food to corn with the tax
credit deviates signiﬁcantly (in terms of level and variation) from the
elasticities for the benchmark and the binding mandate (as in Table 3).
In order to identify the sensitivity of price transmission elasticities to
exogenousmodel elasticities, we regress (separately for each shock and
scenario) the transmission elasticities obtained from the 5000 simula-
tions on corn supply, corn export demand, food demand, fuel demand,
and gasoline supply elasticities. To ease the interpretation of the results,
the demand elasticities were converted into positive values in all
regressions.
The results in Table 4 show that the food demand elasticity is by far
the strongest determinant of the corn to food price transmission elastic-
ities. The food demand elasticity has a smaller and reverse impact on the
transmission elasticities from food-to-corn. The price transmission
elasticities from corn to food (food to corn) increase (decrease) with
the elasticities of corn supply and corn export demand. However, both
elasticities affect stronger the transmission elasticities from food to
corn than the other way around. Note that the relationship between
the price transmission elasticities and the food demand elasticity is re-
versed compared to the relationship for the corn supply and corn export
elasticities (Table 4). This is because the formula for the price transmis-
sion elasticity for a food demand shock is the reciprocal of the formulas
for other elasticities.
The sensitivity analysis for the fuel demand and the gasoline supply
elasticities shows some heterogeneity across the price transmission
elasticities. For each of the shocks, the price transmission elasticitiesN
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Fig. 4. A summary of the sensitivity analysis.
Table 4
The effect of model supply and demand elasticities on the price transmission elasticities†.
Elasticity of
Corn supply Corn export demand Food demand Fuel demand Gasoline supply
Price transmission elasticity from corn to food
Corn supply shock (Z1) No biofuel 0.0103*** 0.00248*** −1.572*** n.a. n.a.
Mandate 0.0188*** 0.00196*** −1.582*** −0.00038 −0.000188
Tax credit 0.00221*** 0.000231*** −1.544*** 0.00457*** 0.00497***
Corn export shock (Z2) No biofuel 0.00322*** 0.000404*** −1.530*** n.a. n.a.
Mandate 0.00269*** 0.000302*** −1.527*** −0.000343 −0.000157
Tax credit 0.000517** 8.81E-06 −1.521*** 0.000421 0.000632**
Price transmission elasticity from food to corn
Food demand shock (Z3) No biofuel −0.325*** −0.0893*** 0.234*** n.a. n.a.
Mandate −0.484*** −0.0439*** 0.0598*** −0.00121 −0.000558
Tax credit −0.131*** −0.0167*** 0.00592*** −0.320*** −0.349***
*** p b 0.01, ** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1; n.a., not available.
Source: own calculations.
† Coefﬁcients estimated by OLS. The demand elasticities were converted to positive values for an easier interpretation.
197D. Drabik et al. / Energy Economics 55 (2016) 189–199do not respond statistically signiﬁcantly to the changes in fuel demand/
gasoline supply elasticities when the mandate is binding (Table 4). For
all other cases, fuel demand/gasoline supply elasticities generally do sig-
niﬁcantly affect the magnitude of price transmission elasticities. This
heterogeneity is due to the different ways through which the shocks
are transmitted to and interact with the fuel and corn market.
4.2. Price level changes
In addition to analyzing how biofuel policies affect the price trans-
mission, which is a ratio of two relative measures, it is also important
to investigate to what extent biofuels affect the price level changes in
the food supply chain under various market shocks. The elasticities
capture only the relative importance of corn–food prices responses to
market shocks; they ignore the magnitude of the level changes. To
that end, in Table 5 we report a summary of percentage changes in
food and corn prices for the benchmark and the two policy regimes.
These changes indicate the adjustment in price levels to a given shock
over the different policy regimes. We focus on the central estimates of
these changes.
Ethanol's impact on the magnitude of the corn and food price
responses to market shocks strongly depends on the biofuel policy.
Compared to the no biofuel benchmark, both food and corn price re-
sponses are not affected signiﬁcantly when the mandate is binding.
These results are similar to price transmission elasticities reported in
Table 3, where biofuels did not affect price transmission whenmandate
was the binding policy.Table 5
Food and corn price level changes due tomarket shocks under various policy regimes (%)⁎.
No biofuel
(benchmark)
Mandate Tax credit
Food Corn Food Corn Food Corn
Price transmission elasticity from corn to food
Corn supply shock (Z1) Central 10.6 12.7 13.6 16.3 4.6 5.4
Min 6.5 8.2 8.8 11.0 3.0 3.7
Max 22.2 25.2 34.3 39.1 7.6 8.5
Corn export shock (Z2) Central 2.6 3.1 2.0 2.3 0.7 0.8
Min 1.7 2.1 1.3 1.6 0.5 0.6
Max 5.6 6.3 4.4 4.9 1.1 1.3
Price transmission elasticity from food to corn
Food demand shock (Z3) Central 46.4 28.2 48.4 30.3 28.2 9.7
Min 33.4 16.8 35.8 19.4 23.8 6.4
Max 87.0 64.4 110.0 87.1 38.7 16.7
Source: Own calculations.
⁎ Summary statistics for 5000 simulations; the standard deviation in each case is between
0.1 and 8.3.However, when the tax credit is binding, both food and corn price
changes are lower relative to the no biofuel scenario for the corn and
food market shocks Z1, Z2, and Z3. This is in contrast to the price trans-
mission elasticities reported in Table 3, where only the transmission
elasticity from food to corn was reduced by biofuels (i.e., for the food
price shock). The reason is that fuel market absorbs (through biofuels)
the major share of the shocks. With the tax credit, the corn price is
determined by the gasoline price. The only exception is the food price
change for the food demand shock, Z3, which is similar to the change
in no biofuel benchmark. The reason is that the food demand shock in-
duces a direct effect on the foodmarket, causing a corresponding adjust-
ment in food price. However, when this shock is transmitted on the corn
market, it is largely absorbed by the corn quantity adjustment, with the
corn price changing much less than in the benchmark case.5. Conclusions
The rise of the biofuel sector has created an important outlet for
agricultural commodities. Biofuel production absorbs a signiﬁcant
amount of corn, sugarcane, wheat, sugar beet, and oilseeds. The increas-
ing interdependence between the agricultural commodity markets and
energy markets may reduce the dependence of agricultural production
on food markets, which in turn may reduce the price responsiveness
along the whole food supply chain.
The key ﬁnding from our simulation results based on the 2009 data
is that when ethanol production is due to a blender's tax credit, a price
shock originating in the food market transmits to the corn market at a
smaller rate compared to a situation without ethanol production
(i.e., the transmission becomes more imperfect). However, when the
biofuel production is due to a blend mandate, or the price shock origi-
nates in the corn market (regardless of the biofuel policy), the price
transmission does not change. These differences steam from different
effects biofuel policies have on the corn price formation.
A second implication of our study is that the response of corn and
food prices in terms of their level changes to exogenous market shocks
is smaller in the presence of biofuels, indicating that—in some
situations—biofuelsmay reduce themagnitude of the price adjustments
in food markets. This is the case when the tax credit is binding. In this
situation, most of the shock in the food market is absorbed by the fuel
market because of the corn price's direct link to the gasoline price effec-
tuated through ethanol. However, this does not hold when mandate is
binding. The mandate directly determines the volume of the ethanol
production and, therefore, also the amount of ethanol-dedicated corn.
Any shock in the corn or food market is then absorbed by the residual
corn and food markets and not by the fuel market. This is because
corn dedicated for ethanol production is essentially ﬁxed while the
198 D. Drabik et al. / Energy Economics 55 (2016) 189–199residual corn market remains exposed to market shocks at the same
level as in the case of no biofuels.
Our results have important policy implications. The price transmis-
sion along the food chain has recently attracted a lot of attention
among policy makers (Areté, 2012; European Commission, 2009;
Vavra and Goodwin, 2005). It is often argued that the imperfect price
transmission from food to agricultural producer prices is caused by
market failure such as market power of processing industry and/or
supermarkets. For example, in the European Union, the strong interest
of the European Commission in the price formation along the food sup-
ply chain was conﬁrmed by the establishment of the High Level Group
on the Competitiveness of the Agro-Food Industry in 2008. The group
identiﬁed, among others, that the “lack ofmarket transparency, inequal-
ities in bargaining power, and anti-competitive practices have led to
market distortions with negative effects on the competitiveness of the
food supply chain as a whole” (European Commission, 2009). One of
the key policy instruments applied in the EuropeanUnion to strengthen
farmers market position in the supply chain is the support for creation
of agricultural producer organizations (or marketing cooperatives)
(Bijman et al., 2012). The results of our paper indicate that imperfect
price transmission in the agri-food chainmay emerge even in a situation
of no market power existing in the downstream industry if agricultural
markets are linked to biofuels. That is, biofuels might be an additional
cause of the reduced price transmission in the food supply chain.
A second policy implication of our analysis is that biofuelsmay result
in lower adjustment of food prices to market shocks. The magnitude of
food price changes is often argued to be a serious concern particularly
for developing countries due to the large share of food expenditures in
total income of poor consumers and the sizable share of agriculture as
a source of income for many poor farmers (OECD, 2011). It is often
argued that biofuels are one of the causes of the recent increase in
food prices (Babcock, 2011; FAO, 2012). Contrary to this argument,
our results indicate that biofuels may reduce the magnitude of price
adjustments along the agri-food chain. The fact that biofuels link the
agricultural commodity prices to fuel prices makes themmore resistant
to different shocks occurring in agricultural markets.
A third policy implication of our analysis is that the biofuels induce
important income distributional effects among the agricultural market
agents along the agri-food chain. Because ethanol reduces price trans-
mission from food to corn, farmerswill tend to beneﬁt less from a higher
food price but lose less when food prices decrease. The reverse price
transmission (i.e., from corn to food) is not affected by ethanol, hence
the changes in farm level prices will be fully reﬂected in food prices
and thus also in consumers' gains/losses.References
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